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Selling Demand Response Using Options
Deepan Muthirayand, Dileep Kalathilc, Sen Lib, Kameshwar Poollaa, Pravin Varaiyaa
Abstract—Wholesale electricity markets in many jurisdictions
use a two-settlement structure: a day-ahead market for bulk
power transactions and a real-time market for fine-grain supply-
demand balancing. This paper explores trading demand response
assets within this two-settlement market structure. We consider
two approaches for trading demand response assets: (a) an in-
termediate spot market with contingent pricing, and (b) an over-
the-counter options contract. In the first case, we characterize
the competitive equilibrium of the spot market, and show that it
is socially optimal. Economic orthodoxy advocates spot markets,
but these require expensive infrastructure and regulatory bless-
ing.In the second case, we characterize competitive equilibria and
compare its efficiency with the idealized spot market. Options
contract are private bilateral over-the-counter transactions and
do not require regulatory approval. We show that the optimal
social welfare is, in general, not supported. We then design
optimal option prices that minimize the social welfare gap. This
optimal design serves to approximate the ideal spot market for
demand response using options with modest loss of efficiency.
Our results are validated through numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wholesale electricity markets in many jurisdictions use a
two-settlement structure: a day-ahead market for bulk power
transactions and a real-time market for fine-grain supply-
demand balancing. Forecast errors in the day-ahead market
necessitate subsequent balancing in the real-time market. With
deeper penetrations of wind and solar generation, markets must
be able to contend with greater levels of uncertainty stemming
from renewable intermittency. Forecast errors increase, and
balancing supply and demand becomes more challenging. The
traditional approach of balancing using conventional fossil fuel
based reserves is untenable: it is expensive and defeats the
emissions benefits of renewables. Balancing the variability of
intermittent renewable generation through demand flexibility is
a far better alternative to reserve generation, as it produces no
emissions and consumes no resources. This is recognized and
encouraged by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) through its Order 745, which mandates that demand
response be compensated on par with the conventional gen-
eration that supplies grid power [1]. Commercial buildings,
light industry, and households are flexible in their electricity
consumption. These agents can be induced to yield this
flexibility in exchange for monetary compensation. This paper
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explores trading demand response assets within a traditional
two-settlement market structure.
We consider the setting where a Load Serving Entity (LSE)
supplies electricity to a collection of consumers at the delivery
time T . An aggregator manages the aggregate load flexibility
of these consumers. The LSE interacts directly with the
aggregator and can request a certain aggregate load reduction
which will be reliably produced at the delivery time. The
LSE can purchase bulk power in the day-ahead market and
can also buy balancing power in the real-time market. It also
has access to zero marginal cost renewable generation. We
consider the situation where excess renewable generation is
spilled, and cannot be sold back into the real-time market.
Other generalizations of our results are possible, but we choose
to explore the simplest situation.
When should demand response assets be traded? Well in
advance of the delivery time, the LSE has poor forecasts of
its renewable generation and of clearing prices in the real-
time market. So the LSE prefers to delay its demand response
request close to the delivery time. Conversely, the aggregator
prefers to receive any load curtailment requests well before the
delivery time. This affords its client consumers sufficient lead
time to organize their electricity use and cede their demand
reduction. These considerations argue that demand response
assets should be traded in an intermediate market as a recourse
between the day-ahead and real-time markets.
What is an appropriate mechanism for the intermediate
time trading of demand response assets? Economic orthodoxy
argues in favor of an idealized spot market with contingent
prices from the perspective of efficiency. In this intermediate
spot market, trading takes place after counter-parties digest all
information that is revealed. Therefore, the clearing prices are
contingent on the realized information. While the spot market
is efficient, it has two main drawbacks: (a) pricing is typically
very volatile and does not offer guaranteed income to demand
response assets to compensate for yielding their load flexibility
and for the associated capital costs, and (b) an intermediate
spot market requires organized infrastructure and regulatory
approval which can be very expensive.
To overcome these difficulties, we propose to trade demand
response assets using call options. In our scheme, the LSE
buys a number of call options contracts from the aggregator
at time to, coincident with the gate closure of the day-ahead
market. It pays an option price pio per contract. Each call
option contract affords the LSE the right, but not the obliga-
tion, to receive one unit of load reduction from the aggregator.
These options expire at the intermediate time t1 by which
time they must be exercised or forfeited. To exercise these
options the LSE must pay the aggregator the strike price pisp
per unit of load reduction. The strike price is not contingent,
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it is fixed and known at time to. Payment from the sale of
option contracts provides a guaranteed income to flexible loads
for their demand response capability. Subsequent payment
from the exercise of option contracts compensates loads for
the provision of demand response. Since option contracts can
be viewed as private over-the-counter transactions between
the LSE and the aggregator, our scheme does not require
regulatory blessing or organized market infrastructure.
A. Our Contributions
Our principal contributions are:
• First, we consider optimal energy scheduling from the
perspective of a social planner. We formulate this as a
three stage optimization problem and characterize the op-
timal decisions at each stage: the optimal energy purchase
in the day-ahead market, the optimal demand response (or
load curtailment) decision at the intermediate stage, and
the balancing energy purchase in the real-time market.
This serves as a benchmark for evaluating other market
designs.
• Second, we consider an intermediate spot market with
contingent pricing. We study the interactions of the LSE
and the aggregator in a spot-market. We show that there
exists a competitive equilibrium, and the equilibrium is
socially optimal, i.e., it realizes the same system cost as
the benchmark.
• Third, we study the options market for the LSE and
the aggregator. We show that under some conditions,
a competitive equilibrium always exists, and it is the
optimal solution to a convex optimization problem. We
compare the efficiency of the equilibrium for the options
market and the spot market, and show that the options
market is not necessarily socially optimal. We then design
optimal option and prices which minimize the welfare gap
at the competitive equilibrium.
B. Related Work
There is extensive literature on demand response and work
related to managing the uncertainty with renewable integration
[2]–[17]. These works can be broadly classified as price-based
or contract-based.
Price-based Demand Response: This is a type of demand
response where the consumers alter their energy consumption
based on time varying prices determined apriori by the LSE.
The objective here is to improve overall system benefits by
influencing the consumers to shift their demand. The works
in [2]–[4] propose different approaches to determine the time
varying prices such that the overall system benefits, measured
in terms of efficiency and load variability, are improved. The
authors in [7], [8] study a game theoretic formulation and
propose a pricing strategy that improves system benefits in
Nash equilibrium. Closely related works such as [6] propose
a time varying price policy to utilize flexible storage of EVs
in order to manage load variability. Other works such as
[5] propose a demand response management strategy using
a stochastic optimization procedure that accounts for financial
risks associated with time varying prices.
Distributed Price-based Demand Response: Authors in
[12], [13] and [14] propose iterative distributed load control
schemes with the objective of meeting system requirements
and minimizing consumer discomfort. They primarily address
the coordination of multiple demand response users by iter-
atively discovering the most appropriate electricity price and
its variation with time.
The setting we consider is different from the above works,
which are primarily concerned with price-responsive demand
response. We propose a market mechanism for direct calling
of a certail level of demand response instead of using price
to influence demand. Here, a LSE can buy DR contracts
from aggregators of DR in the day-ahead market and can
determine the amount of DR to call in the real-time market at
an intermediate stage when more information is available on
renewable generation at real-time.
Multi-stage Stochastic Decision: Varaiya et al. [18] propose
a risk-limiting dispatch approach for integrating renewable
energy in the grid. They formulate a multi-stage stochastic
control problem where at each stage the utility makes purchase
decisions based on the available information. Rajagopal et
al. [19] extend this approach and characterize optimal power
procurement policies as threshold based decisions. Our work
parallels the approach of Varaiya et al. [18]. In particular, we
extend their approach to a contract setting as proposed in this
paper, where the decision of two entities are coordinated in
a multi-stage decision problem through an options contract
mechanism.
Contract-based Demand Response: The works in [10], [11],
[20] address the problem of demand response aggregation
from a mechanism design perspective. The objective of the
mechanism design is to gather demand response contracts
at minimal cost and at preferrably maximal privacy so that
the aggregator or the LSE can meet the DR requirements
of the system. Alternatively, demand response contracts that
treat demand response as a differentiated good, based on their
power level and duration, have also been proposed [21], [22].
Our work is different from these set of works in the sense that
we provide a multi-settlement market framework for trading
the aggregated demand response in the electricity markets.
Options: Authors in [23]–[27] discuss the pricing of elec-
tricity options for hedging price risks in deregulated electricity
markets. Authors in [28] provide a forward electricity con-
tract with a call option to hedge against price risks while
exercising load flexibility. Authors in [29] provide a similar
forward contract bundled with a option to hedge against price
for interruptible services. In [30] a forward contract with
a bilateral financial option for buyers and sellers to take
advantage of their flexibility and reduse their price risks is
discussed. In [31], a options based hedging mechanism for
a LSE is discussed and in [32] an options contract for a
producer is discussed. There are works such as [33] that
discuss long term options contract as a mechanism for ensuring
generation adequacy. Other works such as [34]–[36] provide
option models for assessment of the value of generation
and demand response investment decisions. Authors in [37]
provide a review of application of real option models for
valuing electricity generation projects and renewable energy
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Fig. 1: Players, interactions, and decision time-line.
projects. In this work we propose options market for trading
aggregated DR in an intermediate market that allows the LSE
to call for load curtailment based on an improved forecast of
the wind power that is available at this intermediate time. The
options market is proposed as an alternative to the intermediate
spot market that can be cumbersome to organize and volatile
in terms of the revenue it generates for the service providers.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the basic
notions and notation in Section II. In Section III, we consider
the problem of energy scheduling with demand response from
the perspective of a system planner. In Section IV we discuss
the implementation of intermediate spot market for scheduling
demand response. We present the options market mechanism
in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper with a brief
description of future research directions in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The setting we consider is shown in Figure 1. A load serving
entity (LSE) supplies l units of electricity to a collection of
consumers for delivery at time T . The demand l is considered
inelastic and known at time to. Indeed, day-ahead load forecast
errors are within 1%−2% [38]. The LSE buys q units of energy
in the day-ahead market at price pida. At the intermediate
time t1, he extracts y units of demand response, which incurs
a disutility of φ(y). The LSE has access to zero marginal
cost random renewable generation w which is realized at the
delivery time T . To meet its demand obligations, the LSE buys
the remaining energy required qrt in the real-time market at
price pirt. The total energy purchase must satisfy:
l ≤ q + qrt + w + y. (1)
Note that we consider the situation where excess renewable
generation is spilled, and cannot be sold back into the real-
time market. This is necessary to ensure that the LSE does
not sell all of the renewable generation back in the real-
time market and can be imposed as a regulation. The demand
response purchase made at the intermediate time t1 is based
on a forecast f1 of w and forecast of pi
rt.
A. Model Uncertainties
Let f0 denote the information available at to. Let p(w|S) be
the conditional probability of the wind given the intermediate
forecast state S at time t1. The forecast state S can be regarded
as a sufficient statistic which parameterizes the information on
wind at time t1. We parameterize S ∈ [0, 1]. We call this an
information state. Define
ps(w) = p(w|S = s), Ps(z) =
∫ z
w=0
ps(w)dw,
where Ps(z) is the probability that the wind at time T is less
than z given the information state s. Let α(s) be the prior
probability density function of the information state, i.e.,
α(s) = P (S = s|f0)
We assume that real-time price pirt is a random variable
and denote the expected real-time price conditioned on the
information state by,
pirts = E[pi
rt|S = s]
The day-ahead price pida is known at time t0. We use ES [·] and
Ew [·] to denote the expectation with respect to the information
state and the randomness in wind, respectively. Let E [·] denote
the joint expectation. We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. (i) P(w ≥ z|S = s) < P(w ≥ z|S = s′),
∀z, if s′ > s, (ii) pirts′ < pi
rt
s , if s
′ > s, (iii) pirt and w are
conditionally independent given the information state s.
Assumption (i) imposes a stochastic ordering on wind
conditioned on the information state s ∈ [0, 1]. The intuitive
interpretation is that larger values of s indicate (stochasti-
cally) more wind. This assumption guarantees that Ps′(z) <
Ps(z), ∀z, if s
′ > s so that the cumulative distribution Ps(·)
and Ps′(·) do not intersect. Assumption (ii) similarly imposes
an ordering on the expected value of the real-time price
conditioned on the information state. The ordering is such that
higher values of s correspond to a lower expected real-time
price (because more wind power reduces demand in the real-
time market). Assumption (iii) imposes that the information
state s contains all the causal factors that determine the real-
time price and wind power w. This is a reasonable assumption
because the information state s represents the underlying state
of nature.
B. Decision Making of Players
The players of the problem include an LSE, an aggregator,
and a social planner. We model them as follows.
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Load Serving Entity (LSE): The LSE is responsible for
satisfying the energy balance specified by equation (1). At time
t0, it buys q units of energy at a price pi
da from the day-ahead
market. At time t1, it receives a load reduction of ys units
from the aggregator when the information state s is revealed,
and makes a payment Rs(ys). At time T , the renewable w is
revealed, and the LSE purchases the remaining energy from
the real-time market, i.e., qrt = (l−q−ys−w)+. The ex-post
cost for the LSE given the information state s is,
JLSEs = pi
daq +Rs(ys) + pi
rt(l − q − ys − w)+ (2)
Aggregator: The aggregator suffers a disutility φ(ys) for
a load reduction of ys units, and receives a compensation
payment Rs(ys) from the LSE. The ex-post cost for the
aggregator, given the information state s, is as follows,
Jaggs = φ(ys)−Rs(ys) (3)
We assume that the disutility function satisfies the assumption
given below.
Assumption 2. φ(ys) is twice differentiable, and is strongly
convex in ys, i.e., φ
′′(ys) > 0.
Social Planner or Entity (e): We consider a hypothetical
agent, the social planner, which combines the roles of the
LSE and the aggregator. We denote decision variables and
cost functions of the social planner with the superscript e for
entity. This social planner buys q units of energy from the
day-ahead market, receives a load curtailment of ys units at
an intermediate time t1, acquires zero marginal-cost realized
wind power w at time T , and purchases the remaining energy
(l− q− ys−w)+ from the real-time market for load balance.
Given s, the ex-post cost for the social planner (also called
the system cost) is:
Jes = pi
daq + φ(ys) + pi
rt(l − q − ys − w)+ (4)
Payment for demand response is an internal exchange between
the LSE and aggregator, and does not appear in the social
planner ledger. In the sequel, we first discuss the optimal
scheduling problem for the social planner, and then we study
the interaction between the LSE and the aggregator in the
intermediate market and options market. We characterize the
competitive equilibrium in both markets, and compare the
system costs.
III. OPTIMAL SCHEDULING FOR THE SOCIAL PLANNER
This section studies the optimal scheduling of energy from
the perspective of the social planner. We separately consider
the scheduling problems with and without demand response.
We use these solutions as benchmarks to compare the various
market mechanisms we propose in subsequent sections.
A. Optimal Scheduling without Demand Response
In the absence of demand response, the social planner is
confined to purchase energy from the day-ahead and real-
time markets. Let Jendr(q) be the expected cost for the social
planner in the absence of demand response. This is a function
of the day-ahead purchase q and is
Jendr(q) = pi
daq + E[pirt(l − q − w)+] (5)
This implicitly accounts for the balance inequality (1) neces-
sary to service the load l. The optimal decision of the social
planner is
qendr = argmin
q≥0
Jendr(q) (6)
We have the following:
Proposition 1. Jendr(·) is convex. The minimizer q
e
ndr solves
pida − Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l − q
e
ndr)] = 0 (7)
Assumption 3. To avoid trivial results, we assume that the
day-ahead market price is discounted from the expected real-
time market price, i.e., pida < Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l)]. This will ensure
that qendr > 0.
B. Optimal Scheduling with Demand Response
With demand response, the net expected cost for the social
planner as a function of the first-stage purchase is given by,
Je(q) = pidaq + Es
[
min
ys≥0
Jes (ys; q)
]
(8)
where Jes (ys; q) is the expected second-stage cost conditioned
on s and q and is given by,
Jes (ys; q) = φ(ys) + Ew
[
pirts (l − q − ys − w)+|s
]
(9)
The optimal first-stage and second-stage decisions, qe and yes
respectively, are{
qe = argminq≥0 J
e(q),
yes = argmin0≤ys≤l J
e
s (ys; q
e)
(10)
The optimal system cost is then J∗e = Je(qe). Using the fact
that both (8) and (9) are convex, we can solve for qe and yes
using the conditions given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Je(·) and Jes (·) are convex. For any given first
stage decision q, the second-stage decision yes is given by,{
φ′(yes) = pi
rt
s Ps(l − q − y
e
s), if φ
′(yes) < pi
rt
s Ps(l − q)
yes = 0, if φ
′(yes) ≥ pi
rt
s Ps(l − q)
(11)
The first-stage decision qe is given by the solution of,
pida − Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l − q
e − yes)] = 0 (12)
The proof is offered in Appendix B.
C. Socially Optimal Costs
The optimal costs for the social planner with and without
demand response are
J∗dr = J
e(qe) and J∗ndr = J
e
ndr(q
e
ndr)
respectively. Clearly, J∗dr ≤ J
∗
ndr. These social cost values
serve as benchmarks for our market mechanism designs. In
Section IV, we show that a spot market with contingent prices
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realizes the socially optimal cost J∗dr. In Section V, we show
that trading demand response in an options market will, in
general, result in a loss of social welfare. We further select
options prices so that this welfare gap is modest. As a result,
the over-the-counter options market can well approximate the
idealized spot market.
IV. SPOT MARKETS WITH CONTINGENT PRICES
In Section III, we considered the optimal scheduling of
energy from the perspective of a hypothetical social planner.
We now show that the optimal scheduling decisions of the
social planner can be realized through a spot market with
contingent prices. In this market, the LSE is a buyer, and the
aggregator is the seller.
At time t0, the LSE buys q units of energy from the day-
ahead market at a price pida. At time t1, the information state s
is revealed. Depending on this revelation, the LSE purchases
ys units of energy curtailment from the aggregator, paying
a price piins . This is a contingent price as it depends on the
realized information state s. At time T , the LSE receives wind
energy w and purchases the required balancing energy (l−q−
ys−w)+ from the real-time market at a price pi
rt. The expected
cost for the LSE as a function of the first-stage purchase q is
given by,
JLSE(q) = pidaq + Es[min
ys≥0
JLSEs (ys; q)] (13)
where JLSEs (ys; q) is the second stage cost and is given by,
JLSEs (ys; q) = pi
in
s ys + Ew[pi
rt
s (l − q − ys − w)+] (14)
The optimal first and second-stage purchase decisions of the
LSE are qLSE and yLSEs respectively. These are given by{
qLSE = argminq≥0 J
LSE(q)
yLSEs = min0≤ys≤l J
LSE
s (ys; q
LSE)
The expected cost for the aggregator under the information
state s is
Jaggs (ys) = φ(ys)− pi
in
s ys. (15)
The optimal selling decision of the aggregator is
yaggs = min
0≤ys≤l
Jaggs (ys)
Note that the optimal buying/selling decisions of agents
(LSE/aggregator) depend on the contingent prices piins . The
market is said to be in equilibrium if the prices are such that
the optimal buying and selling decisions of the agents are
consistent under all realizations of s. We make this notion
more precise below.
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium with Contingent
Prices). The contingent prices {pi∗ins }, optimal buying deci-
sions of the LSE q∗LSE, {y∗LSEs }, optimal selling decisions of
the aggregator {y∗aggs } constitute a competitive equilibrium,
if the following holds for all s ∈ S:

JLSE(q∗LSE) = min
q≥0
JLSE(q) (16a)
JLSEs (y
∗LSE
s ) = min
0≤ys≤l
JLSEs (ys; q
∗LSE) (16b)
Jaggs (y
∗agg
s ) = min
0≤ys≤l
Jaggs (ys) (16c)
y∗LSEs = y
∗agg
s (16d)
Here (16a) and (16b) require (q∗LSE , y∗LSEs ) to be the
optimal decision of the buyer, (16c) requires y∗aggs to be the
optimal decision of the seller, and (16d) ensures that the traded
demand response quantities are in balance. We require this
balance at all realizations of s.
Let J∗LSE be the expected cost for the LSE, and let J∗agg
be the expected cost for the aggregator at any competitive
equilibrium. The system cost of the market at any competitive
equilibrium is
J∗cp = J∗LSE + J∗agg. (17)
Define the minimum system cost for the social planner as
J∗e = Je(qe). This is a lower bound of the system cost for
any market. Therefore, we can use J∗e as a benchmark to
evaluate the efficiency of the options market. The market is
called efficient (or socially optimal) if the system cost for
the market attains the lower bound J∗e at the competitive
equilibrium. We make this precise in the following definition.
Definition 2 (Socially Optimal Equilibrium with Contingent
Prices). An equilibrium with contingent prices is said to be
socially optimal, if J∗cp = J∗e.
We now offer the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. (a) There exists at least one competitive equilib-
rium under contingent pricing. (b) All competitive equilibria
are socially optimal. Equivalently, define y∗s = y
∗LSE
s = y
∗agg
s
at any competitive equilibrium, then

Je(q∗LSE) = min
q≥0
Je(q), (18a)
Jes (y
∗
s ) = min
0≤ys≤l
Jes (ys; q
∗LSE). (18b)
The proof is deferred to Appendix C. Condition (18) re-
quires that competitive equilibrium is the optimal solution to
the social planner’s problem. Therefore, it can be computed
by solving (11) and (12). This result implies that the optimal
scheduling of the social planner can be realized though an
intermediate spot market with contingent prices.
V. OPTIONS MARKETS AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
In the previous section, we showed that the intermediate
spot market is efficient. However, implementing intermediate
spot markets requires organized infrastructure and regulatory
approval which can be prohibitive. We now present an interme-
diate market for demand response using call options. These are
private over-the-counter transactions which do not need utility
blessing or organized infrastructure.
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A. Options Market
At time t0, the LSE purchases energy q in the day-ahead
market. Concurrently, he buys x units of options from the
aggregator at the option price pio. By purchasing these options,
the LSE acquires the right, without the obligation, to receive y
units of load reduction from the aggregator where 0 ≤ y ≤ x.
At time t1, the LSE can exercise these options by paying a
strike price pisp per contract. Clearly, the number of exercised
options ys depends on the information state s revealed at time
t1. The strike price pi
sp is ex ante, and does not depend on
the information state. At time T , the aggregator delivers the
contractually obligated load reduction ys. The LSE observes
the wind energy w and purchases the remaining balancing
energy (l − q − ys − w)+ in the real time market.
Since we are considering a competitive market, we assume
the agents are rational and price takers. They make their
buying/selling decisions based on the market prices pio and
pisp. The expected cost for the LSE is a function of the first
stage decisions q and x:
J˜LSE(q, x) = piox+ pidaq + Es[ min
0≤ys≤x
J˜LSEs (ys)], (19)
Here J˜LSEs (·) is the second stage cost for the LSE given by
J˜LSEs (ys) = pi
spys + Ew[pi
rt
s (l − q − ys − w)+]. (20)
Denote the optimal first and second-stage decisions of the LSE
by q˜LSE , x˜LSE and y˜LSEs . These decisions solve{
(q˜LSE, x˜LSE) = argmin(q,x) J˜
LSE(q, x),
y˜LSEs = argminys≤x J˜
LSE
s (ys)
In the options market, the expected cost for the aggregator
is
J˜agg(x) = Es[φ(ys)− pi
spys]− pi
ox, (21)
The decision variable of the aggregator is the quantity of
options x offered for sale. The optimal selling decision is:
x˜agg = argmin
x≥0
J˜agg(x) (22)
We now define an equilibrium notion for our options market.
Definition 3 (Competitive Equilibrium for Options Market).
The options price pi∗o, the strike price pi∗sp, the optimal day-
ahead purchase q˜∗, the optimal buying decision of the LSE
x˜∗LSE and the optimal selling decision of the aggregator
x˜∗agg constitute a competitive equilibrium if

J˜LSE(q˜∗, x˜∗LSE) = min(q,x) J˜
LSE(q, x)
J˜LSEs (y˜
∗LSE
s ) = min0≤ys≤x˜∗LSE J˜
LSE
s (ys)
J˜agg(x˜∗agg) = min0≤x≤l J˜
agg(x)
x˜∗LSE = x˜∗agg
At the competitive equilibrium, the volume of options that
the LSE is willing to buy balances the volume of options that
the aggregator is willing to sell. Therefore, we have x˜LSE =
x˜agg . We now offer the main results of this section.
Theorem 2. There exists a competitive equilibrium for options
market. Define the following at a competitive equilibrium,
q˜∗ = q˜LSE , x˜∗ = x˜∗LSE = x˜∗agg and y˜∗s = y˜
∗LSE
s . Then
the competitive equilibrium satisfies,
pida − Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l − q˜
∗ − y˜∗s)] = 0
pi∗o + pi∗LSEEs[I{y˜
∗
s = x˜
∗}]
− Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l − q˜
∗ − y˜∗s)I{y˜
∗
s = x˜
∗}] = 0
pi∗o + pi∗LSEEs[I{y˜
∗
s = x
∗}]− φ′(x∗)Es[I{y˜
∗
s = x˜
∗}] = 0,
where y˜∗s satisfies,
y˜∗s =


0, if Ps(l − q˜
∗) < pi∗sp/p¯irts
x˜∗, if Ps(l − q˜
∗ − x˜∗) > pi∗sp/p¯irts
l − q˜∗ − P−1s (pi
∗sp/p¯irts ), otherwise
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix D. We
comment that the competitive equilibrium consists of four
variables (pi∗o, pi∗sp, q˜∗, x˜∗) determined by three equations.
Therefore, there is one degree of freedom which induces mul-
tiple competitive equilibria. We will illustrate these equilibria
prices through a numerical simulation in Section VI.
B. Redesign of Options Market
The options market proposed in the previous section is
asymmetric with respect to the decision of the buyer and the
seller. That is the decision of the LSE is q and x, while
the decision of the aggregator is only x. This asymmetry
can provide market advantage to the buyer. To address this
concern, we propose a redesign of the options market where
the decision of the buyer and the seller is symmetric. We
show the existence of a competitive equilibrium, and study
its various properties.
B.1 Symmetric Decision Making
Consider the following modification to the options market:
before time t0, the aggregator proposes a demand response
offer to the LSE. The aggregator chooses l′ > 0 and dictates
that x + q = l′. This endows the aggregator the power to
negotiate on q: the aggregator offers x units of options, only
if the LSE buys l′−x units of energy in the day-ahead market.
For the moment, we treat l′ as given.
Upon receiving the demand response offer, the LSE decides
whether or not to accept it. There is no trade of load reduction
if the offer is not accepted. When the offer is accepted, the
expected cost for the LSE is
J˜LSE(x) = piox+ pida(l′ − x) + Es[ min
ys,ys≤x
J˜LSEs (ys;x)],
(23)
where J˜LSEs (·) is the second stage cost and is given by,
J˜LSEs (ys;x) = pi
spys+Ew [pi
rt
s (l− l
′+ x− ys−w)+]. (24)
The optimal first and second-stage decisions of the LSE are{
x˜LSE = argminx≥0 J˜
LSE(x),
y˜LSEs (x) = argminys≤x J˜
LSE
s (ys;x)
(25)
Note that the second-stage decision y˜LSEs depends on x. From
now on, we do not express this dependence explicitly as it is
implied by context. The expected cost for the aggregator and
its optimal decisions remain as in (21) and (22).
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We assume that the LSE and the aggregator are price takers.
The options market attains a competitive equilibrium if the
supply of options balances the demand of options.
Definition 4 (Competitive Equilibrium for Options Market).
Given any l′ such that 0 ≤ l′ ≤ l, the options price pi∗o,
the strike price pi∗sp, the optimal buying decision of the LSE
x˜∗LSE and the optimal selling decision of the aggregator
x˜∗agg constitute a competitive equilibrium if:

J˜LSE(x˜∗LSE) = min
0≤x≤l′
J˜LSE(x), (26a)
J˜LSEs (y˜
∗LSE
s ) = min
0≤ys≤x
J˜LSEs (ys;x
∗LSE) (26b)
J˜agg(x˜∗agg) = min
0≤x≤l′
J˜agg(x) (26c)
x˜∗LSE = x˜∗agg. (26d)
The choice of l′ is determined by the willingness of the LSE
to accept the demand response offer. If the LSE accepts the
offer, its optimal cost is J˜LSE(x˜LSE). Else, its cost is equal
to that of optimal cost without DR, i.e., J∗endr. Thus, the LSE
will accept the contract proposed by the aggregator if
J∗endr ≥ J˜
LSE(x˜LSE). (27)
However, J˜LSE(xLSE) depends on the options price pio,
which is not revealed when the LSE makes the decision.
Ideally, l′ should be such that (27) holds for any pio. We present
a candidate of l
′
that satisfies this condition:
Proposition 3. If l′ = qendr, the LSE always accepts the
demand response offer, i.e., J∗endr ≥ J˜
LSE(xLSE) for ∀pio ≥ 0.
The idea is as follows: q = qendr is the optimal decision of
the LSE if it declines the demand response offer. Therefore,
when l′ = qendr, the LSE loses nothing if it accepts the demand
response offer. This is because, there exists a LSE decision,
i.e., x = 0 and q = qendr, that satisfies the condition x + q =
qendr and also attains the same cost.
B.2 Properties of Competitive Equilibrium
We now focus on the existence, efficiency and optimality
of the competitive equilibrium for options market.
Theorem 3. Given any l′ ∈ [0, l], there exists a competitive
equilibrium (pi∗o, pi∗sp, x˜∗LSE , x˜∗agg) for the options market,
and x˜∗LSE = x˜∗agg is the optimal solution to:
min
0≤x≤l′
pida(l′ − x) + Es[φ(y˜
LSE
s ) + J˜
LSE
s (y˜
LSE
s )], (28)
where y˜LSEs is the second stage optimal decision for the LSE
and,
y˜LSEs =


0, if Ps(l − l
′ + x) < pi∗sp/p¯irts
x, if Ps(l − l
′) > pi∗sp/p¯irts
l − l′ + x− P−1s (pi
∗sp/p¯irts ), otherwise
(29)
The proof is given in Appendix E. The optimization problem
(28) is convex, and the optimal value of (28) is the social cost
at the competitive equilibrium of the options market.
Similar to the options market in Section V-A, there are
multiple competitive equilibria because for any equilibrium
price pair pis∗o and pi∗sp, a higher options price with a
lower strike price can be equally acceptable to both the LSE
and the aggregator. To compare the efficiency of different
markets, let J˜∗LSE(pisp) and J˜∗agg(pisp) be the expected cost
at competitive equilibrium for the LSE and the aggregator,
respectively. Define the system cost at competitive equilibrium
by,
J˜∗cp(pisp) = J˜∗LSE(pisp) + J˜∗agg(pisp). (30)
In addition, let J∗endr be the optimal value of problem (5), then
the following proposition provides a comparison of the optimal
cost of the different markets that we have discussed so far.
Proposition 4. Given any l′ and pisp, the social cost of
the options market at the competitive equilibrium is lower
bounded by J∗cp and upper bounded by J∗endr, i.e., J
∗cp ≤
J˜∗cp(pisp) ≤ J∗endr.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the Appendix. It
indicates that the efficiency of the options market outperforms
that of the market without demand response, but is no better
than that of the spot market with contingent prices.
The following theorem presents the optimal strike price that
minimizes the social cost at the competitive equilibrium:
Theorem 4. There exists an optimal strike price p˜i∗LSE ,
such that J˜∗cp(p˜i∗LSE) ≤ J˜∗cp(pisp) for all pisp, and p˜i∗LSE
satisfies:
p˜i∗LSE =
∫ s2
s1
φ′(ys)β(s)ds∫ s2
s1
β(s)ds
(31)
where β(s) =
α(s)
p¯irts ps(l − q − ys)
.
The proof of Theorem 4 is in the Appendix. It shows that
the optimal strike price is the average of the marginal disutility
over a skewed distribution β(s).
VI. CASE STUDIES
This section illustrates the proposed options market and
validates the results through numerical simulation. We con-
sider a particular time interval where the LSE needs to deliver
electricity to a total load of l = 3MW. We emphasize that
this is without any loss of generality because larger or smaller
load can be captured by scaling the size of the options and
load reduction.
Define the information state s as a real number between 0
and 1. i.e., s ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that s is unknown at time t0
(e.g., one day ahead), but it known at time t1 (e.g., one hour
ahead). Here we associate s with the average hourly wind
energy level on the next day1. The probability distribution of
s and w can be derived based on historic data. In particular,
we collect the 5-minute wind generation data between Nov
2019 - May 2020 in California from CAISO [39]. The data
is scaled based on the size of the case study, where s = 0
represents zero wind generation, and s = 1 represents the
maximum wind generation over this period. The histogram
of s is shown in Figure 2. The empirical distribution of s
1Since the realization of wind is a random variable, s is monotonically
associated with the expectation of w.
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scheduling without demand response,
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can be constructed accordingly. To simplify the computation,
we approximate the empirical distribution with a polynomial
function to obtain closed-form expression of α(s).
To obtain the conditional probability distribution ps(w),
we represent the wind generation of each time instance as
w = w¯(1 + σ), where w¯ denotes the average wind generation
of the hour2, and σ is the percentage of deviation from w¯.
Assume that σ is i.i.d. for each data sample within the dataset
[39] of 5 minute resolution. The empirical distribution of σ
can be constructed from the dataset. We observe that the
empirical distribution of σ is symmetric with respect 0 and
displays exponential decay. Therefore, we approximate it using
a symmetric piece-wise exponential function. The empirical
distribution (bar plot) and its analytic approximation are shown
in Figure 3. Clearly, the approximation is rather accurate.
2Based on our definition, w¯ is a monotone function of s. Here we set
w¯ = 2s+ 0.5.
We randomly select several day-ahead and real-time prices
in Berkeley, California, Jan, 2020 [40], and derive that the
average day-ahead and real-time LMP are $26.76/MWh and
$29.86/MWh, respectively. Suppose the conditional expecta-
tion of the real-time price is a linear function of s in the form
p¯irts = 31.71 − 3.71s
3. For simplicity, consider a quadratic
distutility function φ(y) = 15y + 15y2. In this example, both
Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
We consider four cases: (a) optimal scheduling without
demand response, (b) spot market with contingent pricing,
(c) options market and (d) redesign of options market. We
compute the optimal decisions in each case and derive the
competitive equilibrium for these market setups. The system
costs in these cases are compared.
3We set the parameter of this linear model so that (i) the average real-time
price equals the real data, i.e., $29.86/MWh, and (ii) wind energy affects
real-time price by the maximum of 10%.
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1. Optimal Scheduling without Demand Response: The LSE
buys energy from the day-ahead and real-time markets. Using
Proposition 1, the optimal day-ahead purchase is qendr =
1.35 MW. The optimal system cost is Jendr(q
e
ndr) = $55.469.
2. Optimal Scheduling with Demand Response: With demand
response, the optimal day-ahead purchase is qendr = 1.19 MW
and the optimal system cost is Jendr(q
e
ndr) = $52.127.
3. Spot Market with Contingent Price: Solving equation (18),
the optimal day-ahead purchase is q∗ = 1.19MW. The optimal
load reduction and contingent price given the information state
s are shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively. Figure 4 reveals
that when s is larger, the LSE expects more wind at the
delivery time T and therefore calls on less load reduction at the
intermediate time t1. As a result, the competitive equilibrium
price is lower when s is larger, as shown in Figure 5.
4. Options Market: The competitive equilibrium of the options
market can be derived based on Theorem 2 and Theorem 3,
respectively. The setup of these two options markets are
distinct. Here we solve the competitive equilibria under both
market schemes and compare their performances in terms of
the system cost at the competitive equilibria.
We first compute the competitive equilibrium of the options
market presented in Section V-A. Based on Theorem 2, the
competitive equilibrium constitutes four decision variables
(pi∗o, pi∗sp, x˜∗, q˜∗) that are determined by three equations.
This indicates that there is an extra degree of freedom,
which induces multiple competitive equilibria. Figure 8 shows
competitive equilibrium prices of the options market. Clearly,
there is a continuum of competitive equilibrium prices and the
options price is a decreasing function of the strike price. This
is intuitive since the objective functions of the LES and the
aggregator are jointly determined by pio and pisp. Therefore,
for any pair of (pio, pisp) at the competitive equilibrium, the
combination of a higher pio and lower pisp is equally acceptable
as another competitive equilibrium price. Figure 7 shows that
as the strike price increases, the traded options increases due
to the decrease of options price. Figure 8 shows that the day-
ahead purchase q at the competitive equilibrium first decreases
(pi∗sp ≤ $3.4/WMh) and then increases ($3.4/WMh <
pi∗sp ≤ $31.3/WMh). The first regime (pi∗sp ≤ $3.4/WMh)
is accompanied with a sharp increase in traded options as
shown in Figure 7. Figure 9 shows the exercised load reduction
in real time under different information state when the strike
price is at $22.6/WMh. Clearly, ys is a decreasing function
of s, which indicates that less load reduction is called when
more wind energy is available for free.
Figure 10 compares the system costs at the competitive
equilibria of the original (Section V-A) and the redesigned
options market (Section V-B) under different equilibrium strike
prices. The equilibrium of the redesigned market is derived
based on (28). It is clear that the system cost at the competitive
equilibrium for the redesigned market is consistently lower
than than that of the original one, while the difference of
these two markets is more significant when the strike price is
smaller. At the optimal strike price that minimizes the system
cost, both the original options market and the redesigned
market attained a cost of 52.154, which is close to the system
cost for the spot market,i.e., 52.127. This indicates that by
carefully choosing the strike price, the options market can
almost achieve the same system cost as the efficiency spot
market. However, obtaining the optimal options market price
may require information not possessed by the system operator.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have studied a novel market model for trading demand
response using options. We have shown that demand response
can be used as an intermediate recourse between the real-time
market and the day-ahead market. Under some conditions,
this options market admits a competitive equilibrium. We
studied the efficiency of this equilibrium, and obtained the
optimal strike price that yields the minimum system cost at
the competitive equilibrium. In future work we plan to address
option markets with multiple intermediate stages and also the
case where the LSE can exercise market power.
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VIII. PROOFS
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The objective function Jendr is,
Jendr(q) = pi
daq+
∫ 1
s=0
∫ (l−q)
w=0
pirts (l−q−w)ps(w)dw α(s)ds
(32)
By taking partial derivative we get,
dJendr
dq
= pida −
∫ 1
s=0
pirts Ps(l − q)α(s)ds
d2Jendr
dq2
=
∫ 1
s=0
pirts ps(l − q)α(s)ds
Since the second derivative is non-negative, Jendr is convex.
The solution is obtained by equating the first derivative to zero.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The cost of the second stage is,
Jes (ys) = φ(ys) +
∫ (l−q−ys)
w=0
pirts (l − q − w − ys)ps(w)dw.
Taking partial derivatives, we have,
∂Jes
∂ys
= φ′(ys)− pi
rt
s Ps(l − q − ys)
∂2Jes
∂y2s
= pirts ps(l − q − ys)
Since the second order derivative is non-negative, Jes (ys) is
convex. Using first derivative, if φ(ys)
′ ≥ pirt1 Ps(l − q), then
the optimal load curtailment is yes = 0. If φ(ys)
′ < pirts Ps(l−
q), yes is given by equating the first order condition to zero,
∂Jes
∂ys
= φ(ys)
′ − pirts Ps(l − q − ys)
∣∣
ys=yes
= 0. (33)
This leads to (11). Next, we compute the right derivative of
the first stage cost Je(q),
d+Je
dq
= pida +
∫ 1
0
∂+yes
∂q
φ′(ys)α(s)ds.
−
∫ 1
0
(1 +
∂+yes
∂q
)pirts Ps(l − q − y
e
s)α(s)ds (34)
Here
∂+yes
∂q is the right partial derivative of y
e
s with respect to
q. Note that when φ′(ys) ≥ pi
rt
s Ps(l − q),
∂+yes
∂q = 0. When
φ′(ys) < pi
rt
s Ps(l − q), we have (33). In either case, (34) is
equivalent to,
d+Je
dq
= pida −
∫ 1
0
pirts Ps(l − q − y
e
s)α(s)ds. (35)
Similarly, we can derive the left derivative of Je(q). It equals
the right derivative. Therefore, Je(q) is differentiable with
respect to q. The second-order right derivative of Je(q) is
as follows,
d2Je
dq2
=
∫ 1
0
pirts ps(l − q − y
e
s)
(
1 +
∂+yes
∂q
)
α(s)ds.
To prove Proposition 2, it suffices to show that Je(q) is
convex with respect to q. If so, the optimal decision is
obtained by equating the first derivative to 0, which leads to
(12). To this end, we show that d
2Je
dq2 ≥ 0. Note that when
φ′(ys) ≥ pi
rt
s Ps(l − q),
∂+yes
∂q = 0. It trivially holds. When
φ′(ys) < pi
rt
s Ps(l− q), we take partial derivative with respect
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to q on both sides of (33). This indicates that,
pirts ps(l − q − y
e
s)
(
1 +
∂+yes
∂q
)
= 0
Therefore, d
2Je
dq2 = 0. This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. It suffices to show there exists a solution to (16), and
any solution to (16) satisfies (18). According to Proposition
2, it suffices to show that (16) is equivalent to (11) and (12).
Given any q, the optimal solution to (16b) is given by
yLSEs =
{
l − q − P−1s (pi
in
s /p¯i
rt
s ), if pi
in
s < pi
rt
s Ps(l − q),
0, if piins ≥ pi
rt
s Ps(l − q).
(36)
For any q, the optimal solution to (16c) is given by,
yaggs =
{
0, if φ′(0) > piins ,
(φ′)−1(piins ), if φ
′(0) ≤ piins
(37)
Proof for (36) and (37) is similar to that of Proposition 2
and hence we skip the details. Since (36) is continuous and
decreasing, and (37) is continuous and increasing, there is an
intersection. Thus the competitive equilibrium exists. It can be
verified that at the intersection, the equilibrium satisfies (11).
In addition, based on (36), the derivative of the first stage cost
of the LSE is given by,
dJLSE
dq
= pida −
∫ 1
0
pirts Ps(l − q − y
LSE
s )α(s)ds. (38)
At the optimal decision q∗LSE , we have,
pida = Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l − q
∗LSE − y∗s )] = 0. (39)
Therefore, (16) is equivalent to (11) and (12). This completes
the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
We first prove a series of lemmas before giving the proof
of Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. The function J˜LSEs (·) is convex for all s ∈ S. The
unique minimizer y˜LSEs is given by,
y˜LSEs =


0, if Ps(l − q) < pi
sp/pirts
x, if Ps(l − q − x) > pi
sp/pirts
l − q − P−1s (
pisp
pirts
), otherwise
(40)
Proof. The second-stage cost for the LSE is,
J˜LSEs (ys) = pi
spys + pi
rt
s
∫ l−q−ys
0
(l − w − q − ys)ps(w)dw,
The first-order and second-order derivative are as follows,

∂J˜LSEs
∂ys
= pisp − pirts Ps(l − q − ys),
∂2J˜LSEs
∂y2s
= pirts ps(l − q − ys).
Since the second derivative is positive, J˜LSEs (y) is strictly
convex. Then using first derivative and the strict convexity
property the expression for the unique minimizer y˜LSEs fol-
lows.
Lemma 2. The function J˜LSE(q, x) is jointly convex in q and
x. The minimizers (q˜LSE , xLSE) are given by,
pida − Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l − q˜
LSE − y˜LSEs )] = 0
pio + pispEs[I{ys = x
LSE}]
− Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l − q˜
LSE − y˜LSEs )I{ys = x
LSE}] = 0
(41)
Proof. Let s1, s2 ∈ S be such that ys = x for 0 ≤ s ≤ s1
and ys = 0 for s2 ≤ s ≤ 1. Note that s1 and s2 depends on
q and x from the first stage. Then, J˜LSE(q, x) (c.f. (19)) can
be written as,
J˜LSE(q, x) = (piox+ pidaq)
+
∫ s1
s=0
pispxα(s)ds
+
∫ s1
s=0
pirts
∫ (l−q−x)
w=0
(l − q − x− w)ps(w)dwα(s)ds
+
∫ s2
s=s1
pispysα(s)ds
+
∫ s2
s=s1
pirts
∫ (l−q−ys)
w=0
(l − q − ys − w)ps(w)dwα(s)ds
+
∫ 1
s=s2
(
pirts
∫ (l−q)
w=0
(l − q − w)ps(w)dw
)
α(s)ds
We give simplified expressions for the partial derivatives of
J˜LSE w.r.t q and x below,
∂J˜LSE
∂q
= pida −
∫ 1
s=0
pirts Ps(l − q − y˜
LSE
s )α(s)ds
∂J˜LSE
∂x
= pio + pisp
∫ s1
s=0
α(s)ds
−
∫ s1
s=0
pirts Ps(l − q − x)α(s)ds
Once again differentiating the above expressions w.r.t q and x
we get,
∂2J˜LSE
∂x∂q
=
∫ s1
s=0
pirts ps(l − q − x)α(s)ds
∂2J˜LSE
∂q2
=
∫ s1
s=0
pirts ps(l − q − x)α(s)ds
+
∫ 1
s=s2
pirts ps(l − q)α(s)ds
∂2J˜LSE
∂x2
=
∫ s1
s=0
pirts ps(l − q − x)α(s)ds
It follows that the Hessian will be of the form[
(a+ b) a
a a
]
, where a =
∫ s1
s=0
pirts ps(l − q − x)α(s)ds,
b =
∫ 1
s=s2
pirts ps(l − q)α(s)ds.
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It is easy to show that a > 0 and b > 0 always. We give a
very brief argument here. If pisp is large then s2 < 1 trivially
and so b > 0 trivially. But pisp cannot be set large enough
that s2 = 0 because it obviates the need for an intermediate
DR market. Then there will necessarily exist a s1 > 0 and so
a > 0 in this case. If pisp is small then s1 > 0 trivially and
there will always exist a s2 < 1 such that pi
rt
s Ps(l− q) = pi
sp.
It follows that, a > 0 and b > 0 in this case as well. Hence,
by Silvester’s criterion, the Hessian is positive definite. Hence,
by convexity the minimizers of LSE cost satisfy (41).
Lemma 3. The cost function of the aggregator J˜agg(x) is
convex in x.
Proof. Define s1 and s2 in the same way as in the proof of
Lemma 2. Recall that s1 denotes the information state below
which the LSE schedules all of the options and s2 denotes the
information state above which the LSE does not schedule any
of the demand response at all. These varaibles depend on the
decision of the LSE, which are in turn only dependent on the
option prices pio and pisp, which are fixed. As a result, s1 and
s2 will not be affected by the aggregator’s decision x.
The cost function J˜agg(x) is as follows:
J˜agg(x) = −piox+
∫ s1
s=0
(φ(x) − pispx)α(s)ds
+
∫ s2
s=s1
(φ(y˜LSEs )− pi
spy˜LSEs )α(s)ds +
∫ 1
s=s2
φ(0)α(s)ds.
The first order derivative of J˜agg(x) is given by,
∂J˜agg
∂x
= −pio +
∫ s2
s=0
(
φ′(y˜LSEs )− pi
sp
)
α(s)ds. (42)
The second order derivative is given by,
∂2J˜agg
∂x2
=
∫ s2
s=0
φ′′(x)α(s). (43)
Clearly, J˜agg(x) is convex.
Next we show the continuity of q˜LSE(pio, pisp) and
xLSE(pio, pisp) in (pio, pisp) using the implicit function the-
orem. We omit the details for the proof of continuity of
xagg(pio, piLSE).
Lemma 4. The minimizers of LSE cost J˜LSE(q, x) i.e.
(q˜LSE(pio, pisp), x˜LSE(pio, pisp)) are continuous in its argu-
ments.
Proof. By Lemma 2, the minimizers q˜LSE, xLSE satisfy con-
ditions (41). Define,
f(q, x, pio, pisp) =
(
f1(q, x, pi
o, pisp)
f2(q, x, pi
o, pisp)
)
Where f1(q, x, pi
o, pisp) =
∂J˜LSE
∂q
= pida − Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l − q − ys)]
f2(q, x, pi
o, pisp) =
∂J˜LSE
∂x
= pio + pispEs[I{ys = x}]
− Es[pi
rt
s Ps(l − q − ys)I{ys = x}]
(44)
Then the minimizers q˜LSE , xLSE , satisfy f = 0. From Lemma
2 the partial derivatives of ∂J˜
LSE
∂q and
∂J˜LSE
∂x exist. Hence
f(q, x, pio, pisp) is continuously differentiable w.r.t q and x.
Also the derivatives of f1 and f2 w.r.t pio and pi
sp exists and
is given by,
∂f
∂pio
=
(
0
1
)
,
∂f
∂pisp
=
(
−Es[I{0 < ys < x}]
Es[I{ys = x}]
)
This implies that f is continuously differentiable w.r.t q, x, pio
and pisp. From Lemma (2),
H =
[
∂f
∂q
∂f
∂x
]
> 0
at points (q, x, pio, pisp) where pio > 0, pisp ≥ pida and f = 0.
Then by implicit function theorem there exists continuous
functions g1 : (pi
o, pisp) → q and g2 : (pi
o, pisp) → x such
that the minimizers of LSE cost J˜LSE(q, x) are given by
q˜LSE = g1(pi
o, pisp) and xLSE = g2(pi
o, pisp). Hence the
minimizers (q˜LSE(pio, piLSE), x
LSE(pio, pisp)) are continuous
in its arguments.
Similarly we can show that the minimizer of the aggre-
gator’s cost, xagg(pio, pisp) is a continuous function of its
arguments.
We now show the existence of competitive equilibrium for
the options market. Let
z(pio, pisp) = xLSE(pio, pisp)− xagg(pio, pisp)
By Lemma 4, z(pio, pisp) is a continuous function of pio and
pisp. According to the definition, prices pi∗o, pi∗LSE supports
an equilibrium if z(pi∗o, pi∗LSE) = 0. So, it is sufficient
to show that there exists two pair of prices (pio1 , pi
sp
1 ) and
(pio2 , pi
sp
2 ) such that
z(pio1 , pi
sp
1 ) > 0, z(pi
o
2 , pi
sp
2 ) < 0
Then the existence of prices (pi∗o, pi∗LSE) at which
z(pi∗o, pi∗LSE) = 0 follows from the continuity of the function
z(·, ·).
We only give an intuitive proof sketch. Details are omitted
due to page limitation.
If pio1 and pi
sp
1 are very small, the LSE will prefer to get
more load reduction. But the aggregator may not want to offer
any load reduction because the reward is not enough to offset
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the disutility from load curtailment. So, xLSE(pio1 , pi
sp
1 ) −
xagg(pio1 , pi
sp
1 ) will be positive.
On the other hand, if pio2 and pi
sp
2 are very high, the
aggregator may offer more load curtailment. But the LSE may
prefer very small or no load curtailment at all. It may be better
for the LSE to purchase energy from DAM or RTM. So, in
this case, xLSE(pio2 , pi
sp
2 )− x
agg(pio2 , pi
sp
2 ) will be negative.
Now, the existence of (pi∗o, pi∗LSE) follows from the con-
tinuity of z(·, ·).
E. Proof of Theorem 3
We first prove the following lemma before giving the proof
of Theorem 3.
Lemma 5. The function J˜LSE(x) is convex with respect to
x.
Proof. We first plug in the second-stage decision (40) in the
net expected cost function (19). We define two variables, s1
and s2, as follows: s1 and s2 are such that,
y˜LSEs =


0, s2 ≤ s ≤ 1,
x, 0 ≤ s ≤ s1,
l − l′ + x− P−1s (pi
sp/pirts ), s1 ≤ s ≤ s2.
(45)
Then, J˜LSE(x) (c.f. (19)) is given by,
J˜LSE(x) = piox+ pida(l − l′) +
∫ s1
0
pispxα(s)ds
+
∫ s2
s1
pisp
(
l − l′ + x− P−1s (
pisp
pirts
)
)
α(s)ds
+
∫ s1
s=0
∫ l−l′
w=0
pirts (l − l
′ − w)ps(w)dwα(s)ds
+
∫ s2
s=s1
∫ P−1s (pisp/pirts )
w=0
pirts (P
−1
s (
pisp
pirts
)− w)ps(w)dwα(s)ds
+
∫ 1
s=s2
∫ l−l′+x
w=0
pirts (l − l
′ + x− w)ps(w)dwα(s)ds
Using Leibniz rule, the first order derivative of J˜LSE with
respect to x is given by,
∂J˜LSE
∂x
=pi0 − pida +
∫ s2
s=0
pispα(s)ds
+
∫ 1
s=s2
pirts Ps(l − l
′ + x)α(s)ds (46)
Then the second order derivative is given by,
∂2J˜LSE
∂x2
=
∫ s1
s=0
pirts ps(l − q − x)α(s)ds
Since the second order derivative is non-negative, J˜LSE(x) is
convex.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3 and using the above
lemma we can show that there exists an intersection to the
supply and demand curve, which is the competitive equilib-
rium.
Next we show that the competitive equilibrium is the
solution to (28). Let (pi∗o, x˜∗LSE , y˜LSEs , x˜
∗agg) be a com-
petitive equilibrium. For notation convenience, we define the
following, {
J˜LSE(x) , CLSE(x) + piox,
J˜agg(x) , Cagg(x)− piox.
By definition, the competitive equilibrium satisfies

x˜∗LSE = arg min
0≤x≤l′
CLSE(x) + piox, (47a)
x˜∗agg = arg min
0≤x≤l′
Cagg(x) − piox (47b)
x˜∗LSE = x˜∗agg. (47c)
Let x∗ = x˜∗LSE = x˜∗agg , then (47a) is same as,
CLSE(x∗) + piox∗ ≤ CLSE(x) + piox, ∀0 ≤ x ≤ l′, (48)
and (47b) is same as,
Cagg(x∗)− piox∗ ≤ Cagg(z)− pioz, ∀0 ≤ z ≤ l′. (49)
Let z = x, then (48) plus (49) gives,
Cagg(x∗)+CLSE(x∗) ≤ Cagg(x)+CLSE(x), ∀0 ≤ x ≤ l′.
This is equivalent to (28), which completes the proof.
F. Proof of Proposition 4
According to Theorem 1, J∗cp equals the optimal value of
minq J
e(q). Clearly, minq J
e(q) is smaller than the optimal
value of (28). This is because (8) optimizes over ys, while
(28) fixes ys according to (29). Therefore, J
∗cp ≤ J˜∗cp(pisp).
To show that J˜∗cp(pisp) ≤ J∗endr, we simply note that when
x = 0, the value of (28) attains J∗endr. Therefore, the optimal
value of (28) is smaller than J∗endr. This completes the proof.
G. Proof of Theorem 4
Based on Theorem 3, the optimal strike price is the optimal
solution to the following problem,
min
pisp,x∈[0,l′]
pida(l′ − x) + Es[φ(y˜
LSE
s ) + J˜
LSE
s (y˜
LSE
s )], (50)
where y˜LSEs is defined as (29). The first order derivative of
(50) with respect to pisp can be computed as,
∂J˜e(x, pisp)
∂pisp
=
∫ s2
s1
1
p¯irts
(P−1s )
′(
pisp
p¯irts
)[pisp − φ′(ys)]α(s)ds
=
∫ s2
s1
[pisp − φ′(ys)]
p¯irts ps(l − l
′ + x− ys)
α(s)ds,
where the second equation is based on the fact that
(P−1s )
′(
pisp
p¯irts
) =
1
ps(P
−1
s (pisp/p¯irts ))
=
1
ps(l − l′ + x− ys)
.
Note that
∂J˜e(x, pisp)
∂pisp
≤ 0 when pisp ≤ φ′(0), and
∂J˜e(x, pisp)
∂pisp
≥ 0 when pisp ≥ φ′(l′). Since
∂J˜e(x, pisp)
∂pisp
is continuous with respect to pisp, there exists an optimal
strike price p˜i∗LSE , such that φ′(0) ≤ p˜i∗LSE ≤ φ′(l′)
and
∂J˜e(x, p˜i∗LSE)
∂pisp
= 0. The final expression fpr p˜i∗LSE
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follows trivially from the condition
∂J˜e(x, p˜i∗LSE)
∂pisp
= 0. This
completes the proof.
